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A within-statement baseline comparison for detecting lies
Brianna L. Verigina,b , Ewout H. Meijera and Aldert Vrijb
aForensic Psychology Section, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University,
Maastricht, Netherlands; bDepartment of Psychology, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK
To make veracity judgements in individual cases, practitioners may rely on baselining. That
is, they may evaluate a statement relative to a baseline statement that is known to be
truthful. We investigated whether a within-statement verbal baseline comparison could
enhance discriminatory accuracy. Participants (n¼ 148) read an alibi statement of a mock
suspect and provided a veracity judgement regarding a critical two-hour period within the
alibi statement. This critical element was either deceptive or truthful and was embedded into
an otherwise truthful story. Half of the participants received additional instructions to use
the surrounding truthful elements of the statement as a baseline. Instructing participants to
make a within-statement baseline comparison did not improve the accuracy of credibility
assessments.
Key words: baseline technique; comparable truth; deception detection; interviewing
techniques; veracity assessment; within-statement comparison; within-subjects
lie detection.
Introduction
Deception researchers typically report their
results as average scores from groups of partic-
ipants. This research shows that, on average,
liars’ statements are less richly detailed than
those of their truth-telling counterparts (e.g.
Amado, Arce, Fari~na, & Vilarino, 2016;
DePaulo et al., 2003; Luke, 2019). Legal prac-
titioners, in contrast, are rarely interested in
such group averages. They need to know
whether an interviewee in the case at hand is
being deceptive or honest. However, group-
derived estimates do not always reliably gener-
alize to individual cases (Fisher, Medaglia, &
Jeronimus, 2018; Faigman, Monahan, &
Slobogin, 2014).
One option that facilitates decisions at the
individual level is to include a within-individual
comparison (see Vrij, 2016, for a discussion).
One such method, reportedly used in practice
by some police (Ewens, Vrij, Jang, & Jo, 2014;
Frank, Yarbrough, & Ekman, 2006; Inbau,
Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013; U.S.
Department of the Army, 2006) is the baseline
technique. With this technique, interviewers
evaluate an interviewee’s ‘statement of interest’
(i.e. part of the statement for which veracity is
being assessed) relative to a baseline statement
(i.e. part of the interview that is known to be
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truthful). Deception is then determined by
looking for deviations from this established
baseline. Moreover, 71% of experienced
human intelligence interviewers reported
to rely on deviations from baseline to
detect deception (Russano, Narchet, Kleinman,
& Meissner, 2014).
A reason to believe in the efficacy of base-
lining as a lie detection technique derives from
early research on the relationship between
familiarity and deception. A handful of studies
from the late 20th century examined how the
level of familiarity between a liar and an
observer affects lie detection outcomes (e.g.
Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 1980a, 1980b,
1982; Comadena, 1982; Ekman & Friesen,
1974; Feeley, deTurck, & Young, 1995;
Hayano, 1980; McCornack & Parks, 1986).
Collectively, this research showed that ver-
acity judgements were most accurate when
observers had the opportunity to become
familiar with the respondents’ truthful commu-
nication style. For example, Feeley et al.
(1995) had participants judge the veracity of
truthful and deceptive communicators after
viewing between zero and four exposures of
the sender. They found a positive linear rela-
tionship between the amount of familiarity
with the sender and judges’ accuracy. In their
meta-analysis, Bond and DePaulo (2006) com-
pared deception detection accuracy between
judges who had, versus those who had not,
been previously exposed to the individual they
were evaluating. Their results showed that
when judges had been previously exposed to a
target, this baseline exposure or baseline famil-
iarity resulted in a small yet significant
increase in detection accuracy from 52% to
56%. These results support the role of baseline
familiarity – that is, when the sender is famil-
iar to the receiver, such as in personal
relationships.
In police interviews, interviewer and target
are more likely to be strangers, and another
option is to use part of the same interview as
the baseline statement. Ewens and colleagues
(2014) examined the behavioural patterns of
interviewees in response to an initial non-
threatening ‘small-talk’ baseline question
(‘You just read and signed an informed con-
sent form, could you please tell me what you
remember about it and what it said’) compared
to their behaviour in response to investigative
questions, for which they knew their veracity
would be assessed. The results indicated no
effect of this baseline: both truthful and decep-
tive interviewees behaved equally different
between the small-talk baseline and investiga-
tive part of the interview. Palena, Caso, Vrij,
and Orthey (2018) examined two types of
baseline: an initial small-talk baseline and a
comparable truth baseline (i.e. a set of ques-
tions designed to be comparable with investi-
gative questions in terms of, for example,
content, stakes and time-frame; Ewens et al.,
2014; Vrij, 2008). They compared similarities
in participants’ nonverbal and verbal behav-
iours when responding to baseline and investi-
gative questions, using the two types of
baseline. They found that liars and truth-tellers
in the small-talk baseline condition did not dif-
fer in their level of similarity between the
baseline and investigative questions, adding
further evidence to the ineffectiveness of this
approach. Their results did, however, reveal
that truth-tellers showed significantly more
similarity than liars in the comparable baseline
condition, though only in terms of spa-
tial details.
Two previous studies examined the effect
of verbal baselining on observers’ accuracy
rates. Caso, Palena, Carlessi, and Vrij (2019)
tested police officers’ ability to assess credibil-
ity when provided with a comparable truth
baseline compared to when no baseline was
provided. No differences were found for total
and truth accuracy between conditions,
although observers who made a baseline com-
parison did obtain higher lie detection accur-
acy rates. Caso, Palena, Vrij, and Gnisci
(2019) found more promising results. These
authors looked at the effects of small-talk and
a comparable truth baseline on laypeople’s
deception detection accuracy. This study
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revealed that (a) participants in the comparable
truth condition outperformed those in the
small-talk condition in terms of total accuracy
rates, and (b) only observers who used a
comparable truth baseline performed signifi-
cantly better than chance levels in their
total accuracy for distinguishing truth-tellers
from liars.
Taken together, previous research on base-
lining shows that to enhance diagnostic accur-
acy, a comparable truth baseline should be
used. That is, the baseline statement must be
equivalent to the statement of interest in terms
of content, time-frame, stakes, cognitive and
emotional involvement, and questioning con-
text (Caso, Palena, Vrij, et al., 2019; Ewens
et al., 2014; Palena, Caso, Vrij, & Orthey,
2018; Vrij, 2008). Despite the importance of
the baseline statement being equivalent to the
target portion of the statement, each of the pre-
vious studies compared the effect of an initial,
separate baseline statement to a target portion
of an investigative interview. Investigating
whether a baseline statement could be derived
from parts of the interviewee’s statement
could have important implications for
practitioners who may be inclined to draw
such comparisons between corroborated and
uncorroborated portions of an interview-
ee’s account.
The objective of the present study was to
investigate whether introducing a within-state-
ment baseline comparison could improve the
accuracy of participants’ veracity judgements.
Participants read the alibi statement of a mock
suspect and provided a veracity judgement
regarding a critical two-hour period within the
alibi statement. This critical element was either
deceptive or truthful and was embedded into
an otherwise truthful story. We examined
whether providing an instruction to utilize a
comparable baseline (i.e. informing partici-
pants that all information, with the exception
of the critical element, has been confirmed to
be truthful) could enhance participants’ detec-
tion accuracy. We hypothesized that partici-
pants who received the baseline instruction
would have more accurate veracity judgements
than participants who did not receive the base-
line instruction.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 148 adult participants
(120 females; 28 males) between the ages of
17 and 45 years (Mage ¼ 20.53 years, SD ¼
3.17). Our sample size was calculated prior to
data collection by multiplying the total number
of statements (n¼ 74) by two, ensuring that
each statement was evaluated twice. Given
this sample size, and an a of .05, we had an
85.6% chance of rejecting the null hypothesis
if there was a medium effect size (f ¼ 0.25;
Cohen, 1988). Only participants who were
proficient in reading and writing English were
eligible for the study. They were compensated
with either course credit or a e5 voucher. The
study was approved by the standing ethical
committee. The study was pre-registered and
approved via the Open Science Framework
(http://j.mp/2IjvL51).
Statements
The statements that participants evaluated
were previously collected by the authors
(Verigin, Meijer, & Vrij, 2020). These state-
ments represent accounts provided by student
research participants who were instructed to
provide oral alibi statements to convince an
interviewer that they were innocent of a hypo-
thetical crime. For the present study, we incor-
porated the statements that were entirely
truthful recollections of an interviewee’s
events on a particular day (n¼ 37), and the
statements that were truthful accounts contain-
ing a lie from 1.00pm to 3.00pm (n¼ 37).
1 For the latter group, interviewees truth-
fully reported their events on the day in ques-
tion, before 1.00pm and after 3.00pm;
however, during the critical element (i.e.
between 1.00pm and 3.00pm) they were
instructed to fabricate a particular activity.
Thus, participants in the current study assessed
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one transcript that contained a critical element
that was either deceptive (i.e. embedded into
an otherwise truthful account) or truthful (i.e.
part of an entirely truthful account). Each of
the 74 statements was evaluated twice by two
independent participants.
Ground truth
We attempted to establish partial ground truth
of the statements by asking participants to
self-report the truthfulness of both elements of
their statement (on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being
not at all truthful and 10 being completely
truthful). Truth-tellers reported that both their
general alibi (M¼ 9.32, SD¼ 0.88) and the
critical element (M¼ 9.59, SD¼ 0.90) were
almost completely truthful. Those who pro-
vided the embedded lie reported that their gen-
eral alibi was almost entirely truthful
(M¼ 7.92, SD¼ 2.45) whereas the critical
element was mostly deceptive (M¼ 2.62,
SD¼ 2.48). Thus, interviewees appeared to
have largely conformed to the instructions
they received across conditions.
Design
The experiment followed a between-subjects
factorial design: 2 (baseline instruction: pre-
sent vs. absent)  2 (veracity of the critical
element: truth vs. lie). Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the four conditions.
To mimic real-life investigations in which
investigators typically only have one statement
to assess, each participant judged only one
statement. The dependent measure was the
accuracy of participants’ veracity judgements.
Two accuracy scores were created by recoding
participants’ binary and Likert scale truth–lie
judgements with the ground truth of the ver-
acity of the critical element.
Procedure
Participants arrived at the lab and provided
informed consent. Afterwards, they received a
detailed instruction letter (see Appendix)
explaining that their task was to imagine
themselves in the role of a police detective
who was investigating a violent burglary that
had occurred recently. Participants were told
that the suspect was interviewed by police and
had provided an alibi statement for the entire
day in question, from morning to evening.
They were informed that the critical element
of the alibi was from 1.00pm to 3.00pm on
this day. The critical element within each tran-
script was highlighted yellow to ensure this
was clearly understood. Participants were
instructed to read the entire statement care-
fully, but to make an assessment regarding the
veracity of only the highlighted critical elem-
ent. All participants were told that it was
important to make the correct decision because
it would earn them a chance to win e50 from a
raffle draw.
Participants who were assigned to the
baseline-present condition received additional
instructions prior to reading the transcript.
They were informed that as the lead investiga-
tor, they had access to other sources of infor-
mation for the case, and this collateral
evidence confirmed that the ‘general’ alibi
statement, before 1.00pm and after 3.00pm,
was truthful (participants were not actually
provided this collateral evidence). Participants
were instructed to use this knowledge to com-
pare the ‘general’ portion of the interviewees’
alibi to the ‘critical element from 1.00pm to
3.00pm’. They were asked to try to identify
any patterns or changes in the verbal content
between the general alibi and the critical elem-
ent that may indicate how credible the sus-
pect’s account was during the highlighted
critical element.
After reading the instructions, all partici-
pants received one written transcript of a sus-
pect’s alibi statement, and they were given up
to 10 minutes to read it. We used written tran-
scripts to allow for highlighting the critical
element in yellow. After reading the transcript,
participants were prompted to first provide a
binary veracity judgement (lie or truth) regard-
ing the highlighted critical element. Then, they
rated their veracity judgement on a 7-point
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Likert scale (1¼ completely truthful to
7¼ completely deceptive). Subsequently, par-
ticipants were prompted (a) to provide an
open-ended description of the verbal cues they
used to form their veracity judgement and (b)
to select veracity cues from a predetermined
list. To preserve manuscript length, the coding
and analyses of participants’ veracity cues are
reported in the Supplementary Materials. Once
completed, participants responded to a short
questionnaire that included a motivation
check, general study experience questions and
demographics information (i.e. age, sex, race,
native language and education). Upon finish-
ing, participants were debriefed, and the study
was concluded. All participants were entered
into the e50 raffle, regardless of the accuracy
of their veracity judgements. Participation in
the study took approximately 30 minutes.
To evaluate the accuracy of participants’
veracity judgements, the binary truth–lie
judgements were transformed into incorrect
and correct veracity decisions, according to
the ground truth.
Results
Motivation, experimental realism and
self-perceived lie detection ability
Several 2 (baseline instruction: present, absent)
 2 (veracity of the critical element: truth, lie)
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were con-
ducted on participants’ responses to a series of
7-point Likert scales (1¼ not at all, 7¼ very).
These analyses revealed that participants, on
average, were highly motivated (M¼ 6.29,
SD¼ 0.87), with no significant differences
between baseline and veracity conditions, F(3,
144) ¼ 1.07, p ¼ .366, g2P ¼ .022. On average,
participants reported to answer questions hon-
estly (M¼ 6.82, SD¼ 0.45), with no signifi-
cant differences between baseline and veracity
conditions, F(3, 144) ¼ 0.29, p ¼ .830, g2P ¼
.006. On average, participants found the
instructions very clear (M¼ 6.49, SD¼ 0.80),
with no significant differences between base-
line and veracity conditions, F(3, 144) ¼ 1.26,
p ¼ .290, g2P ¼ .026. We also observed that
participants, on average, found the statements
realistic (M¼ 5.39, SD¼ 1.24), with no sig-
nificant differences between baseline and ver-
acity conditions, F(3, 144) ¼ 0.35, p ¼ .789,
g2P ¼ .007. Additionally, participants self-
reported to be average lie detectors (M¼ 4.10,
SD¼ 1.14), with no significant differences
between baseline and veracity conditions, F(3,
144) ¼ 1.11, p ¼ .345, g2P ¼ .023.
Veracity judgements
Participants’ veracity judgements were ana-
lysed using a two-way between-subjects
ANOVA on the Likert scale judgements, and
a logistic regression on the binary data. In add-
ition, we also subjected the binary judgements
to a two-way between-subjects ANOVA.
Although duplicate, we report this analysis to
allow for a comparison with previous research
and because it allows for the calculation of
Bayes factors, which helps with the interpret-
ation of the results. The Bayesian factors (BF;
for interpretation, see Jarosz & Wiley, 2014;
Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013) are reported in
line with the cut-off points outlined by
Jeffreys (1961). The approximate evidence
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of binary and Likert veracity judgements across conditions.
Baseline instruction No baseline instruction
Deceptive element Truthful element Deceptive element Truthful element
Binary judgement .73 (.45) .38 (.49) .59 (.50) .43 (.50)
Likert judgement 4.62 (1.44) 3.92 (1.57) 3.89 (1.49) 4.16 (1.57)
Note: Means; standard deviations in parentheses. The binary judgements have been recoded for accuracy, whereas
the Likert scores are in their original form.
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categories are as follows: values between 1
and 3 indicate weak evidence for the alternate
or null hypothesis, between 3 and 10 indicate
strong evidence, and above 10 are considered
very strong evidence. The interaction model
within JASP combines both main effects and
the interaction effect; therefore, evidence for
the interaction term individually was calcu-
lated by dividing the interaction model by the
main factors (e.g. Wagenmakers et al., 2016).
For ease of interpretation, BF10 is used to indi-
cate the Bayes factor as evidence in favour of
the alternative hypothesis, whereas BF01 is
used to indicate the Bayes factor as evidence
in favour of the null hypothesis.
Table 1 displays the means and standard
deviations of both the binary and Likert judge-
ments. Overall, the accuracy of participants’
binary judgements, where 0 represents incor-
rect and 1 represents correct judgements, did
not differ significantly from chance level
(M¼ .53, SD ¼ .50), t(147) ¼ 0.82, p ¼ .413,
d ¼ 0.06. To examine whether the baseline
instruction increased participants’ ability to
accurately discriminate between lies and
truths, we conducted a 2 (baseline instruction:
present, absent)  2 (veracity of the critical
element: truth, lie) between-subjects ANOVA
on the accuracy of participants’ binary veracity
judgements. Contrary to our hypothesis, the
main effect of the baseline instruction was not
significant, F(1, 144) ¼ 0.26, p ¼ .613, g2P ¼
.002; BF01 ¼ 5.06, meaning that participants
who received the baseline-present instructions
(M¼ .55, SD ¼ .50, 95% confidence interval,
CI [.44, .67]) were not significantly more
accurate in their veracity judgements than par-
ticipants who received the baseline-absent
instructions (M¼ .51, SD ¼ .50, 95% CI [.40,
.63]). This analysis revealed a main effect of
the veracity of the critical element, F(1, 144)
¼ 10.33, p ¼ .002, g2P ¼ .067; BF10 ¼ 18.49,
with lies (M¼ .66, SD ¼ .48, 95% CI [.55,
.77]) being judged more accurately than truths
(M¼ .41, SD ¼ .49, 95% CI [.29, .52]).
Finally, the veracity of the critical element by
baseline instruction interaction effect was also
not significant, F(1, 144) ¼ 1.40, p ¼ .238, g2P
¼ .010; BF01 ¼ 2.32, indicating that the base-
line instruction had no differential effect on
the accuracy of participants’ veracity judge-
ments for lies and truths.
The logistic regression on the binary judge-
ment with predictor variables (baseline instruc-
tion: present, absent, and veracity of the
critical element: truth, lie) and the accuracy of
participants’ binary veracity judgements as the
dependent measure, revealed a significant
overall model, v2(2) ¼ 10.18, p ¼ .006,
Nagelkerke R2 ¼ .09. Contrary to our hypoth-
esis, the baseline instruction was not a signifi-
cant predictor of classification accuracy (p ¼
.609, 95% CI [0.43, 1.64]). The veracity of the
critical element, however, was a statistically
significant predictor (p ¼ .002): participants
who evaluated a statement containing a decep-
tive critical element had 2.88 times higher
odds (95% CI [1.47, 5.63]) of making a correct
veracity judgement than those who evaluated a
statement containing a truthful critical element.
The 2 (baseline instruction: present,
absent)  2 (veracity of the critical element:
truth, lie) between-subjects ANOVA on partic-
ipants’ Likert scale veracity judgements
revealed no significant differences. We did not
observe a significant main effect of the base-
line instruction, F(1, 144) ¼ 0.95, p ¼ .332,
g2P ¼ .007; BF01 ¼ 3.69 (Mbaseline-present ¼
4.27, SD¼ 1.54, 95% CI [3.92, 4.62] versus
Mbaseline-absent ¼ 4.03, SD¼ 1.53, 95% CI
[3.68, 4.38]). Nor did we find a significant
main effect of the veracity of the critical elem-
ent, F(1, 144) ¼ 0.75, p ¼ .388, g2P ¼ .005;
BF01 ¼ 4.04 (Mlies ¼ 4.26, SD¼ 1.50, 95% CI
[3.91, 4.61] versus Mtruths ¼ 4.04, SD¼ 1.57,
95% CI [3.69, 4.39]). Finally, the Veracity 
Baseline interaction effect was not significant,
F(1, 144) ¼ 3.80, p ¼ .053, g2P ¼ .026; BF01
¼ 0.84.
Discussion
It is well documented that observed lie detec-
tion rates hover around 50% (e.g. Bond &
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DePaulo, 2006). We replicated this finding.
We found that when making a binary judge-
ment, participants were significantly better at
detecting lies than at detecting truths. Contrary
to our hypothesis, however, we found that par-
ticipants who were instructed to utilize a
within-statement comparable baseline did not
outperform the control group in terms of over-
all lie–truth discrimination accuracy.
Previous research revealed that the com-
parable truth baseline technique can enhance
observers’ judgement accuracy (Caso, Palena,
Vrij, et al., 2019). A possible explanation for
the divergence in findings between this study
and our own stems from how the statements
were generated. In the experiment by Caso,
Palena, Vrij, et al. (2019), interviewees
reported about experimental tasks they had
completed. Our study, in contrast, used state-
ments about participants’ experienced activities
on a particular day. Consequently, our partici-
pants were mostly unconstrained in their
reports. These paradigms differ systematically
in the source of deception, which was either
scripted by the researcher (Caso, Palena, Vrij,
et al., 2019, i.e. a scripted task; Vrij, 2008) or
drawn freely from the participant’s own
experience (current study, i.e. an autobiograph-
ical task; Sporer & Sharman, 2006). When lies
are self-generated, the deceiver can elaborate
with personal experience, whereas lies
designed by the researcher cannot be so easily
embellished. As a consequence, it is possible
that the statements resulting from the different
sources of deception were perceived differently
by the lie-detectors. Scripted tasks, relative to
autobiographical tasks, may have been more
straightforward to evaluate, which perhaps
contributed to the incongruent findings
between the present study and that of Caso,
Palena, Vrij, et al. (2019). A second explan-
ation for these results could be derived from
our ground truth manipulation check.
Compared to interviewees who reported
entirely truthful recollections of their day,
interviewees who embedded a lie reported
lower ratings of truthfulness for the general,
truthful portion of their statement. Thus, the
truthful baseline of liars’ statements may have
been more comparable with their lies, which
could have weakened a lie-detector’s ability to
make accurate decisions. Although this may
accurately reflect real-world conditions in
which interviewees interweave truths and lies
(e.g. Vrij, 2008), for the purposes for testing
the efficacy of within-statement baselining
future research should utilize a more controlled
method for establishing baseline truthfulness.
The analysis of variance of the binary ver-
acity judgements allows for a comparison to
the results of previous work (Caso, Palena,
Vrij, et al., 2019). These authors found that
using a comparable truth baseline led to sig-
nificantly above-chance levels in total accuracy
for distinguishing truth-tellers from liars (d ¼
0.34). We found no effect of the baseline
instruction with a Bayes factor indicating sub-
stantial evidence for the absence of an effect.
To directly compare to previous research, we
also calculated a Cohen’s d effect size, which
reaffirmed a very small effect (d¼ 0.08) of the
baseline instruction on participants’ binary
judgements. The finding from the Likert judge-
ments are, however, more ambiguous. This
measure also indicated no effect of the baseline
instruction, but the veracity by baseline inter-
action revealed a p value of .053 and was
accompanied by an inconclusive Bayes factor
of 0.84 in favour of the null hypothesis. This
pattern suggests that although we did not find
evidence that the within-statement baseline
comparison was an effective lie detection tool,
we also cannot rule out that it may have an
effect that was too small for our study to pick
up. Future research should replicate our study
with an increased sample size. Although our
power analysis indicated that we had sufficient
power to detect an effect size of similar nature
of Caso, Palena, Vrij, et al. (2019) had it been
present, we may have been underpowered to
detect a smaller effect size.
Current methods of verbal baselining may
require further refinement before they can be
reliably used to detect deception. In two
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studies to date (the current study and Caso,
Palena, Carlessi, et al., 2019), instructing
observers to make comparisons of the verbal
content between known-truthful and target
portions of a statement did not improve the
accuracy of credibility assessments. In both
experiments, participants in the baseline con-
ditions were invited to search for deviations
or patterns that might be indicative of deceit.
Alternatively, explicitly training participants
to look for empirically valid verbal deception
cues, such as the richness of detail (e.g. Luke,
2019) or the verifiability of information (e.g.
Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014), may increase
the effectiveness of baselining.
In sum, we did not find evidence that the
within-statement baseline technique can
enhance deception detection accuracy.
Additional work is required to refine the tech-
nique and determine its true efficacy across
different contexts.
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Appendix
Experimental instructions
Dear Participant,
Please imagine yourself in the role of a
district detective in the Criminal Investigation
Department of the Limburg Police. You are
the lead detective for an investigation into a
violent burglary that occurred approximately
one week ago. Your colleague just finished
interviewing a suspect, and your job is to
review the interview statement and to assess
the suspect’s credibility. The interviewee has
provided an alibi statement for the entire day
in question, from morning to evening, but the
critical period of time (i.e. the “statement of
interest”) that you are most interested in is
from 1:00pm to 3:00pm.
Your task is to read the statement care-
fully and to make a decision about the truth-
fulness of the critical statement of interest (i.e.
the highlighted information, the period of time
from 1:00pm to 3:00pm). You will then
respond to several questions regarding
your decision.
It is extremely important that your deci-
sion is correct, if not, either the perpetrator
gets away with the crime OR you may send
an innocent person to jail. Plus, if you make
the correct decisions regarding truthfulness,
you will be entered into a raffle to win e50.
Additional instruction for baseline-
present condition:
As the lead investigator, you have access
to other sources of information for this
case. This evidence confirms that the
“general” alibi statement before 1:00pm
and after 3:00pm is truthful. Please use
this knowledge to compare the “general”
part of the interviewees’ alibi to the
“statement of interest from 1:00pm to
3:00pm.” Try to identify any patterns or
changes in the verbal content between
the general alibi and the statement
of interest that may indicate how credible
the suspect’s story from 1:00pm to
3:00pm is.
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